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ABSTRACT
What are the legitimate types of argument in constitutional debate? This is a perennial question in
American law and every generation of constitutional scholars has the right to ask it anew. For over
thirty years, Phillip Bobbitt's taxonomy of legitimate constitutional argument ypes has reigned as
the most influential and enduring in the scholarly discourse. In a recent article, Jamal Greene has
proposed a welcome but flawed rhetorical re-conception of Bobbitt's venerable typology. By
identifying and correcting the errors in Greene's framework, this Article provides a rigorous
theoretical grounding for the entire constitutional law and rhetoric project.
When properly grounded, constitutional law and rhetoric reveals how proof and persuasion
operate in constitutional argument. The rhetorical perspective recognizes that our deepest
constitutional disputes turn on value argument. Acknowledging value argument as a legitimate
part of constitutional discourse in turn promotes rational discussion of the hard choices inherent
in the Court's most vexing cases. A fully developed constitutional aw and rhetoric framework thus
helps us assess these vexing cases and confront what we really fight about when we fight about the
Constitution.
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INTRODUCTION
What are the legitimate types of argument in constitutional de-
bate? This is a perennial question in American law and every genera-
tion of constitutional scholars has the right to ask it anew. For over
thirty years, Phillip Bobbitt's taxonomy of legitimate constitutional
argument types has reigned as the most influential and enduring in
the scholarly discourse.' In his recent article Pathetic Argument in Con-
stitutional Law, Jamal Greene has proposed a rhetorical re-conception
of Bobbitt's venerable typology.2 Though Greene's rhetorical turn is
welcome, his new typology is flawed. By identifying and correcting
three critical errors in Greene's framework, this Article provides a
rigorous theoretical grounding for the entire constitutional law and
rhetoric project.
The first error identified is one of omission. Greene introduces a
new rhetorical dimension to Bobbitt's typology but fails to challenge
Bobbitt's propositional account of constitutional argument-the view
that legitimate debate is solely confined to propositions about what
4the constitution means. Rhetoric comprehends the situation differ-
ently. Constitutional debates may involve appeals to reason (logos),
authority (ethos), and/or emotion (pathos). While appeals to logos and
ethos attack or defend specific propositions about constitutional
meaning, appeals to pathos may directly support judgments about
1 See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION, at xi-
xii (1982) [hereinafter, BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE]; PHILIP BOBBIT,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, at vii-viii (1991) [hereinafter BOBBITr,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION]; Philip Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1233
(1989). Literally hundreds of law review articles have referenced Bobbitt's taxonomy
over the years, and two recent cites confirm its enduring influence. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq,
Tiers of Scrutiny in Enumerated Powers Jurisprudence, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 579 n.11 (2013);
Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453,
460, n.n.22 & 24 (2013).
2 See generally Jamal Greene, Pathetic Argument in Constitutional Law, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
1389 (2013). It bears emphasis that the word "pathetic" in Greene's title is actually the
adjectival form of the Greek rhetorical word/concept "pathos." Greene might have alter-
natively entitled his piece, Pathos-Based Argument in Constitutional Law.
3 This paragraph describes the argument advanced in Part III infra.
4 We might characterize the propositional account as stating that legitimate constitutional
arguments must always take this form: Proposition P (about the Constitution) is true because
[constitutional argument].
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outcomes-who wins or loses particular cases. Such emotion-based
judgments may derive from intuitive notions of right or wrong rather
than from articulated propositions about constitutional meaning.5
Though Greene defends the legitimacy of pathetic argument in con-
stitutional law, he fails to defend the legitimacy of non-propositional
argument. This Article fills that gap.
The second error corrected is taxonomic.' Greene usefully distin-
guishes between the subjects of constitutional argument (e.g., text,
history, doctrine, etc.) and modes of persuasion in argument (i.e.,
logos, ethos, and pathos). However, Greene uses inconsistent terminol-
ogy to describe this key distinction. This Article clears up potential
confusion by introducing two time-tested rhetorical terms. Subjects
of constitutional argument are identified as rhetorical topoi, while
modes of persuasion are described as rhetorical pisteis. On-the-
ground constitutional argument is then conceptualized as the inter-
section of topoi and pisteis-the union of content and form. This vo-
cabulary not only brings theoretical precision, but it also helps ex-
plain Bobbitt's long misunderstood notion of "modality."
The third error identified has the most significance for general
theories of constitutional adjudication.! Greene consciously omits
Bobbitt's prior category of "ethical" argument from his new typology.
This effectively removes "value argument" from the list of legitimate
subjects of constitutional argument. This Article characterizes this
move as descriptively and normatively flawed. Some of our society's
most profound constitutional disputes implicate deep and conflicting
values. Advocates can and should appeal to those values in framing
their constitutional arguments. If we wish to honestly confront what
we really fight about when we fight about the Constitution, value ar-
gument needs to be restored to our constitutional law and rhetorical
typology.
Once these three basic errors are corrected, the constitutional aw
and rhetoric project will stand on stronger theoretical footing. Read-
ers will understand the rhetorical nature of constitutional discourse
and how proof and persuasion operate in constitutional argument.
Such, at least, is this Article's ambition. Now comes the roadmap:
Part I sets the scene by describing Bobbitt's basic typology and
Greene's proposed rhetorical modification. Part II identifies the
5 We might characterize the non-propositional account as stating that legitimate constitu-
tional argument may take this form: Litigant L wins (the instant constitutional controversy) be-
cause [constitutional argument].
6 This paragraph describes the argument advanced in Part IV infra.
7 This paragraph describes the argument advanced in Part V infra.
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challenge this modified typology poses to the standard propositional
account of constitutional argument and defends its legitimacy. Part
III introduces the terms topoi and pisteis to clarify the distinction be-
tween constitutional subjects of argument and modes of persuasion.
Part IV is the longest and most important Part. It makes the case
that value argument belongs in the constitutional law and rhetoric
typology and includes a novel analysis of the nature of rhetorical
ethos. It also illustrates how the theoretical constructs described in
the Article apply to explain three key cases from First and Fourth
Amendment doctrine.
I. ARGUMENT TYPOLOGY AND RHETORIC
Philip Bobbitt originally conceived his now-famous argument ty-
pology as part of an effort to account for the legitimacy ofjudicial re-
view of constitutional questions by the Supreme Court." Previous
scholars had wrestled with the democratic problem inherent in judi-
cial review' by advancing various arguments about the Constitution
that all purported to legitimize review." On Bobbitt's view, these
scholarly debates could never "establish independent legitimacy for
judicial review" because they were "conducted by means of arguments
that themselves reflect[ed] a commitment to such legitimacy."" In
essence, Bobbitt identified constitutional argument as a self-
contained and self-referential discourse that necessarily assumed the
legitimacy ofjudicial review.
8 See generally BoBBIn, CONSTrrUTIONAL FATE, supra note 1, at 3-8.
9 Alexander Bickel memorably dubbed this democratic problem "[t]he [c]ounter-
[m]ajoritarian [d]ifficulty." ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1986).
10 BOBBirr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 1, at 3-5 (describing typical arguments in
favor ofjudicial review).
11 Id. at 5.
12 The notion that a discourse cannot provide independent grounds for its own legitimacy
has numerous philosophical parallels. H.LA. Hart, for example, analyzed the "rule of
recognition" that provides for the means of recognizing what counts as valid "law" in a le-
gal system. See generally H.LA HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 100-10 (2d ed. 1994). Hart
recognized that system's "ultimate" rule of recognition cannot validate itself, id. at 102,
explaining that unlike regular rules of recognition, "there is no rule providing criteria for
the assessment of [the ultimate rule's] own legal validity." Id. at 104. Rather, legitimacy
of the ultimate rule is a social fact accepted by those that participate in the discourse. Id.
at 108. Thomas Kuhn's renowned "paradigms" of scientific thought demonstrate a simi-
larly self-referential and self-legitimizing concept. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE
OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 94 (2d ed. 1970) ("[I]n paradigm choice[,] there is no
standard higher than the assent of the relevant community.").
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Since constitutional argument could never provide an external
justification for its own legitimacy, Bobbitt proposed instead to look
inward. He aimed to understand the "legal grammar that we all
share and that we have all mastered prior to our being able to ask
what the reasons are for a court having power to review legislation."
The core elements of this legal grammar, on Bobbitt's view, are the
six archetypes of constitutional argument. The specific six arche-
types are historical, textual, structural, doctrinal, ethical, and pruden-
tial.1 5
Participants in constitutional discourse "maintain [] the legitimacy
of judicial review" through the continuous practice of archetypical
arguing. ' At bottom, Bobbitt conceptualized " j]udicial review [as] a
practice by which constitutional legitimacy is assured, not endowed.""
Though this conception of judicial review is not universally accepted,
constitutional law scholars continue to embrace the argument typol-
ogy forged from Bobbitt's Wittgensteinian theory. Bobbitt's typolo-
gy has endured for more than thirty years.
Enter Jamal Greene. Greene argues that Bobbitt has failed to
recognize a critical distinction between the "subjects of [constitution-
al] argument" and the "forms of rhetoric" that animate those argu-
ments.m Drawing on Aristotle, Greene then identifies the three an-
13 BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 1, at 6.
14 Somewhat oddly, Bobbitt's introduction in Constitutional Fate puts the number of arche-
types at five. See id. at 7. Later in the book, he introduces ethical argument as a more
controversial type. Id. at 93. By the book's end, and in future work, Bobbitt confidently
puts the number of arguments at six. See id. at 246; see abo BOBBI7T, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at xi (discussing his "description of the six modalities").
15 See BOBBiT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 1, at 3-119; BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 12-13. Critically, Bobbitt refers to these six argument
types as "constitutional modalities." Id. at 12. The meaning of "modality" has divided
critics; this Article brings new perspective on its meaning by applying a rhetorical lens.
See infra Part III.
16 BoaBirr, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 8. Though they can main-
tain legitimacy, none of the arguments "taken singly or together, justify judicial review."
Id. at 8-9.
17 Id. at 9.
18 Bobbitt explicitly identifies his understanding of "the process of legal argument" with
Wittgenstein. See BOBBIrr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 1, at 123, 266 n.I. I count
myself among those persuaded that judicial review and constitutional argument are use-
fully understood as "language games"; cf LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS pt I, § 23 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 2d ed. 1958) ("[T]he term 'language-
game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of
an activity, or of a form of life.").
19 Greene, supra note 2, at 1394. Though Greene focuses on Bobbitt, he aims his critique
more generally at all "[t]axonomists of constitutional argument." Id. at 1391. Richard
Fallon is probably the second-most widely known constitutional argument taxonomist. See
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cient "forms of rhetoric" as logos, ethos, and pathos.20 He finally pro-
poses that constitutional arguments should be classified on a two-
dimensional grid instead of in Bobbitt's one-dimensional list of ar-
chetypes. One axis of Greene's new grid features five (not six) of
Bobbitt's subjects of constitutional argument; the other axis features
logos, ethos, and pathos. Reading the two axes of the grid together
shows how "each form [of rhetoric] may be used to modify a particu-
lar subject of constitutional argument."2 2
The genius of Greene's schema lies in its systematic coupling of
constitutional law and rhetoric. Constitutional scholars have long
contested "whether constitutional law is a specialized discourse or is
instead continuous with other practical forms."2 3  By turning to an-
cient rhetoric, Greene cuts through this intractable jurisprudential
debate. His grid illustrates just how constitutional arguments can re-
volve around specialized subjects while simultaneously deploying
modes of persuasion common to all practical argument. In the adju-
dicative context, "a judge may seek to persuade the audience as to the
substance or valence of arguments from history, text, structure, prec-
edent, and consequences through any of the three modes of persua-
sion [i.e. logos, ethos, and pathos]."24
Greene's insight helps bridge a gap that has unnecessarily divided
the study of law and rhetoric from mainstream constitutional scholar-
ship.23 Rhetoric provides a lens for viewing constitutional argument
id. at 1393, n.14 (citing Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitu-
tionalInterpretation, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1189, 1194 (1987)).
20 Greene, supra note 2, at 1394-95. See also id. at 1391 n.1 (citing ARISTOTLE, ON
RHETORIC: A THEORY OF Civic DISCOURSE (George A. Kennedy trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1991)). Greene also describes logos, ethos, and pathos as "mode[s] of persuasion." Id. at
1394. For an explanation of the terms logos, ethos, and pathos, see infra at 11.
21 Greene, supra note 2, at 1397.
22 Id. at 1424.
23 Id. at 1466-67 (reviewing the debate between "mainstream legal .. . scholars," "attitudi-
nalists, and pragmatists," who all differ on whether constitutional law's ostensibly special-
ized discourse actually constrains judicial reasoning and case outcomes).
24 Id. at 1424.
25 See id. at 1393 (noting that "[l]aw and literature scholars have approached law as a form
of rhetoric, but have not much integrated their accounts with those offered within more
mainstream constitutional scholarship") (citing JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' BOW:
ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985); Robert A. Ferguson, The Judi-
cial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALEJ.L. & HUMAN. 201 (1990)). Of course, the law and
rhetoric literature has grown enormously since the work of pioneers like professors White
and Ferguson. See, e.g., BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AT FIFIY: A RHETORICAL
PERSPECTIVE, at xii (Clarke Rountree ed., 2004); NEIL MACCORMICK, RHETORIC AND THE
RULE OF LAW: A THEORY OF LEGAL REASONING (2005); FRANCISJ. MOOTZ III, RHETORICAL
KNOWLEDGE IN LEGAL PRACTICE AND CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY (2006); THE RHETORIC OF
LAw (Austin Sarat & Thomas R Kearns eds., 4th ed. 1997); Linda L. Berger, Studying and
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both as a species of practical argument and as a specialized discourse
unto itself.0 At its heart, rhetoric promotes a radical discursive
awareness that explains how proof and persuasion operate in any
field.
As Aristotle defined it, the art of rhetoric is "an ability, in each
[particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion."27 Note
how Aristotle confines rhetoric to the "available" means of persua-
sion. Means of persuasion available in one discourse may not be
available at all in another. Proof admissible in one field of argument
may be entirely illegitimate in a different field." As Chaim Perelman
observes: "Each field of thought requires a different type of dis-
course; it is as inappropriate to be satisfied with merely reasonable
argument from a mathematician as it would be to require scientific
proofs from an orator."" Rhetoric recognizes this reality yet still pro-
vides a systematic approach to proof and persuasion that applies
across all argument fields.o
Logos, ethos, and pathos form the backbone of this systematic ap-
proach. Logos concerns reason.' Ethos concerns authority.32 And pa-
Teaching "Law as Rhetoric": A Place to Stand, 16 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 3 (2010); Marouf
Hasian, Jr. & Earl Croasmun, Rheloric's Revenge: The Prospect of a Critical Legal Rhetoric, 29
PHIL. & RHETORIC 384 (1996); Hanns Hohnmann, The Dynamics of Stasis: Classical Rhetori-
cal Theory and Modern Legal Argumentation, 34 AM.J.JURIS. 171 (1989); Kristen K Robbins-
Tiscione, A Call to Combine Rhetorical Theory and Practice in the Legal Writing Classroom, 50
WASHBURN L.J. 319 (2011); Michael R. Smith, Rhetoric Theory and Legal Writing: An Anno-
tated Bibliography, 3 J. AsS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRs. 129 (2006); Patricia M. Wald, The Rhelo-
ric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1373
(1995). Despite the vastness of this literature, it remains true that its contributors have
not systemtically integrated their accounts with Bobbitt's influential argument typology of
constitutional argument. But see EUGENE GARVER, FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT:
PRACTICAL REASONING, CHARACTER, AND THE ETHICS OF BELIEF 161-65 (2004) (analyzing
Bobbitt's typology as demonstrating argumentative pluralism in law). Greene's innova-
tion was thus long overdue.
26 Here I develop concepts introduced in prior rhetorical work. See Colin Starger, Death and
Harmless Error: A Rhetorical Response to judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1
(2008); Colin Starger, The DNA ofan Argument: A Case Study in Legal Logos, 99J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1045 (2009); Colin Starger, The Virtue of Obscurity, 59 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE
LEGE 17 (2013).
27 ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 36 (George A. Kennedy trans.,
2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE]. Please note that although I will generally refer to
the second edition of George Kennedy's Aristotle translation, Professor Greene relies ex-
clusively on the first edition. See supra note 20
28 See STEPHEN E. TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT 14 (updated ed. 2003) (defining ar-
gument fields).
29 CHAIM PERELMAN, THE REALM OF RHETORIC 3 (William Kluback trans., 1982).
30 Cf ToULMIN, supra note 28, at 14-15 (distinguishing between "the form and merits of our
arguments [that] are field-invariant and ... field-dependent").
31 Although Greene translates logos as "appeal[] to logic," Greene, supra note 2, at 1394, I
have previously argued at length why rhetorical logos more broadly concerns argument
May 2016] 1353
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
thos concerns emotion. Aristotle classified all three of these concepts
as rhetorical species of pistis (plural: pisteis) . Although Greene usu-
ally refers to the pisteis as "forms of rhetoric" or "modes of persua-
sion,"" it bears emphasis that the word may also be translated as
"proof."3, Acknowledging logos, ethos, and pathos as species of proof as
well as modes of persuasion drives home the rhetorical perspective.
36Proofin a discourse is what persuades in a discourse.
Although ancient in origin, this perspective on proof has radical
contemporary implications when applied to constitutional discourse.
Specifically, the rhetorical perspective suggests that proof in constitu-
tional argument is not strictly governed by propositional logic. Even
as he defends the legitimacy of pathos-based appeals, Greene fails to
come to grips this implication. This Article therefore takes up the
task.
II. PATHOS AND NON-PROPOSITIONAL ARGUMENT
When Bobbitt first set down his theory of constitutional argument
types, he proposed to describe each type using a term of art: "modal-
ity."3  Significantly, Bobbitt borrowed the concept of modality from
based on reason. See Starger, DNA of an Argument, supra note 26 at 1054-55. In short, logic
has a narrow and formal connotation that does not capture the range of rational argu-
ment properly implied by logos. Id.
32 Greene defines ethos as "appeal[] to the speaker's character." Greene, supra note 2, at
1395. However, I see rhetorical ethos as more broadly concerning appeals to authority.
See infra at 18-20 (setting out ajustification for this view).
33 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 27, at 38-39. Aristotle distinguishes between pisteis intrinsic to
the art of rhetoric-logos, ethos, and pathos-and extrinsic or "non-artistic" pisteis. Id. at 38.
The conceptual difference between artistic and non-artistic pisteis rests on invention. Ad-
vocates do not invent non-artistic pisteis they are externally provided, and advocates use
them to prove their case. Id. Aristotle identified several extrinsic proofs such as "witness-
es," "testimony of slaves taken under torture," and "contracts." Id. In broad strokes then,
non-artistic proofs concern evidence rather than argument.
34 See, e.g., Greene, supra note 2, at 1394 (labeling a pathetic appeal as "a mode of persua-
sion" and then distingsuishing subjects of argument from "forms of rhetoric").
35 ARISTOTLE, supra note 27, at 31, n.11. Depending on context, pistis may take on many
meanings including "appeal," "belief," "trust," and "faith." Id.; see also GARVER, supra note
25, at 3 (framing an entire book of essays as "a meditation on the connections among
those terms [translating pistis]").
36 More than this, the very concept of a "discourse"-a communication triangle joining
speaker, audience, and subject matter in language-is itself bounded by logos, ethos, and
pathos. See Starger, DNA of an Argument, supra note 26 at 1056-57; cf Greene, supra note 2,
at 1399 (rhetoric is "attuned not just to speaker (hence, ethos) and subject (hence, logos),
but also to audience (hence, pathos)) (emphasis added).
37 See BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 11-22.
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analytic philosophy and then applied this analytic concept to law. 8
He defined constitutional modalities as "the ways in which legal
propositions are characterized as true from a constitutional point of
view.""' On Bobbitt's widely shared view, bona fide constitutional ar-
guments are thus propositional. We might characterize their basic
form like this: Proposition P (about the Constitution) is true because [con-
stitutional argument].
From a rhetorical perspective, propositional accounts of constitu-
tional argument misunderstand the nature of legal adjudication. The
law adjudicates disputes. As in all cases, judges in constitutional dis-
putes must decide the case.4o Judges must judge. Establishing the
truth or falsity of legal propositions is thus secondary to reaching
judgment. In any given case, the bottom line is who wins or loses.
On this adjudicatory view, constitutional arguments provide the
grounds for deciding who wins or loses constitutional cases. We
might characterize this argument form: Litigant L wins (the instant
constitutional controversy) because [constitutional argument].
Since arguments in constitutional adjudication ultimately seek to
persuade judges about outcomes in concrete cases, any analogy be-
tween legal argument and dispute in formal scientific or mathemati-
cal discourse is incomplete. Arguments in purely analytic disciplines
can exclusively turn on abstract propositions because there is no
judgment imperative. Proving or disproving propositions is the only
point of the argument. Not so in law. Judgment comes first and
judgment is not always analytic.
Now it is of course correct that most constitutional arguments are
propositional. Giving reasons why proposition P (about the Constitu-
tion) is true or false is both extremely desirable and absolutely critical
38 See id. at 12, 194 n.3 (discussing modal analysis of Russell and Carnap). For a rigorous
analysis of the role of modality in practical argument, see generally TOULMIN, supra note
28, at 28-36 (distinguishing between the force and criteria of modal terms). Toulmin
specifically faults Carnap for "failing to attend sufficiently to the practical function of
modal terms." Id. at 44.
39 BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 12.
40 Though Bobbitt's typology rests on a propositional account of constitutional argument,
even he recognizes the primacy of decision-making in constitutional adjudication. See
BOaBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 166-67 (recounting the sto-
ry of a then-newly appointed Judge Henry Friendly seeking advice from his mentor,Judge
Learned Hand, on how to approach a tricky legal problem; Hand listened and then said:
"Damn it, Henry,Just decide it! That's what you're paid for").
41 Perhaps the most famous codification of this judgment imperative is Article 4 of the Na-
poleanic Code, which prohibited judges fom refusing to decide cases "on the ground of
the silence, obscurity, or deficiency of the law." See CHATM PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-
TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION § 13, at 131 (John Wil-
kinson & Purcell Weaver trans., 1969) (quoting Code Napolbon, art 4).
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for the development of constitutional law over time. Propositional
arguments drive academic constitutional law discourse and dominate
the text of non-perfunctory Supreme Court opinions. This is as it
should be-given the law's commitment to elaborating coherent
rules. Thus, we can characterize the vast majority of constitutional
arguments as having this form: Litigant L wins (the instant constitution-
al controversy) because proposition P (about the Constitution) is true 4 Prop-
osition P is true because [constitutional argument].
So when do constitutional arguments take non-propositional
forms? When do arguments directly support a judgment without
making a specific claim about constitutional meaning? In a word, the
answer here is pathos. Pathos-based arguments sometimes make non-
propositional appeals to judgment. Though Greene never challenges
Bobbitt's propositional conception of modality, his conceptualization
of pathos in constitutional adjudication effectively makes the point:
[I] n constitutional law, pathos is better described as a feature of constitu-
tional conversation, a means rather than an end. The appeal to pathos
occurs not because pathos offers information about substantive constitu-
tional content but because appealing to pathos helps win constitutional
arguments. Pathetic legal argument, then, is a mode of persuasion as to
the substance or valence of particular legal propositions ...
In other words, pathos-based arguments do not always directly assert
substantive propositions about the Constitution. Sometimes pathos-
based appeals provide valence; they give emotional weight to particu-
lar propositions elsewhere advanced through logos- and/or ethos-based
argument.
This is an important insight. Without making the point explicitly,
Greene's article demonstrates that Bobbitt's concept of modality
needs to be modified to account for non-propositional pathetic ap-
peals. Pathetic appeals bypass ordinary propositional argument by
directly "manipulat[ing] the reader's emotions in order to persuade
her as to the ultimate adjudicative outcome."4  As Greene elegantly
puts it: "Some outcome must be thus because deep down in your
heart you know thus to be true.""
To get a flavor of how non-propositional argument plays out in
practice, consider a brief example. Greene points us to Justice An-
thony M. Kennedy's dissent in Stenberg v. Carhart, a case concerning a
42 Greene, supra note 2, at 1422.
43 Id. at 1394.
44 Id. at 1422.
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Nebraska state law that prohibited so-called "partial birth" abortions."'
A five-Justice majority struck down the Nebraska law." In his dissent,
Kennedy described the contested abortion procedure this way: "The
fetus, in many cases, dies just as a human adult or child would: It
bleeds to death as it is torn limb from limb."07 According to Greene,
Kennedy's "gruesome description" in this passage is "designed delib-
erately to disgust and to shame the audience" and is "integral to the
dissent's rhetorical mission."48
Now critics sympathetic to Bobbitt might object to calling the
quote from Kennedy an argument-or at least to calling the quote a
complete argument. Instead, Kennedy's words seem to constitute a
move within an argument. According to this critique, it is wrong to
call this move an argument because Kennedy's description does not
state a proposition about what the Constitution means. It does not
posit that outlawing partial-birth abortions is permissible under the
Constitution because "the fetus . . . bleeds to death as it is torn limb
from limb."
The rhetorical response to this critique invokes the judgment im-
perative. All argument in Carhart ultimately supported judgment on
Nebraska's law, whether it would stand or fall. Although Kennedy's
"gruesome description" does not defend a specific proposition about
the Constitution, it does express a coherent ground for ruling in fa-
vor of Nebraska. It expresses the argument hat Nebraska should win
because of the horror of the gruesome procedure.
Recognizing Kennedy's pathos in Carhart as an argument does not
mean his was a good argument or a legitimate one. Let us focus on
the legitimacy question for a moment.49 If it stood alone, Kennedy's
pathos would in fact be illegitimate. This is precisely because his ar-
gument defends no proposition about the Constitution. (Proposi-
tions are necessary for legitimacy.) Kennedy's pathos, however, does
not stand alone. His pathos instead works in conjunction with his doc-
trinal argument that the Nebraska law was consistent with rules set
down in precedent.0 While his doctrinal argument primarily pro-
45 See id. at 1394 (citing Justice Kennedy's dissent in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914
(2000) as an example of pathetic argument).
46 Carhart, 530 U.S. at 936-37 (finding the law unconstitutional because it lacked any excep-
tion for preservation of health of the mother).
47 Id. at 958-59 (Kennedy,J., dissenting).
48 Greene, supra note 2, at 1394.
49 On the other hand, assessing the merits of the conflicting positions in the abortion de-
bate is well beyond the scope of this Article.
50 Kennedy's doctrinal argument focused on Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992). See generally Carhart, 530 U.S. at 960-66 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (con-
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ceeds via appeals to reason (logos) and authority (ethos), Kennedy's
pathos provides an emotional impetus to accept his doctrinal interpre-
tation above that of the majority.
Even if we disagree with Kennedy's doctrinal argument, we cannot
deem it illegitimate-it did not fundamentally deviate from accepted
norms of constitutional debate. Since Kennedy's pathos only served to
give his otherwise legitimate doctrinal argument emotional valence, it
would be pointless to judge his pathos illegitimate. Pathetic argu-
ments may not assert propositions about constitutional meaning, but
pathos plays an integral role in persuasion and is unavoidable when
judgment is at stake. This is a necessary implication of Greene's arti-
cle and a point worth making explicit.
III. PISTEIS, TOPOIAND MODALITY
Bobbitt's original typology names six different constitutional
"modalities": historical, textual, structural, doctrinal, prudential and
ethical. Greene now challenges this typology as failing to distinguish
between the "subjects" of constitutional argument and its "forms of
rhetoric.",5  Greene identifies the forms of rhetoric as logos, ethos, and
pathos and claims that all of Bobbitt's archetypes (except ethical ar-
gument) are better understood as subjects of constitutional argu-
ment.5 1 While the distinction between constitutional subjects and
modes of rhetoric is analytically sound, Greene's new framework suf-
fers from terminological confusion. This Part, therefore, makes a
brief taxonomic intervention.
Consider the table below, which is a simplified version of one that
appears in Greene's article under the heading: MODALITIES OF
ARGUMENT AND MODES OF PERSUASION.
testing the majority's holding by reasoning that the principles in Caey, as applied to the
facts before the Carhart Court, "demonstrate[] that the interests asserted by the State are
legitimate and recognized by law").
51 Greene, supra note 2, at 1394.
52 Id. at 1394, 1445.
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-inco7 ETHOS PATHOS
TEXT
HISTORY
DOCTRINE
STRUCTURE
CONSEQUENCES
Figure 1: Greene's Argument Table5 3
The labels for each axis implied by the table heading are less than
ideal. "Modes of persuasion" refers to logos, ethos, and pathos while
"Modalities of Argument" presumably refers to text, history, doctrine,
structure, and consequences.
The issue with the "modes of persuasion" label is relatively minor.
In his article, Green refers to logos, ethos, and pathos as "forms of rhet-
oric" or "modes of persuasion."54 While these two descriptions are
quite correct, it is important to recall that pisteis-the word Aristotle
used to describe the rhetorical genus uniting the species of logos,
ethos, and pathos-can also be translated as "proof." 55 Using the same
word to describe proof and persuasion hammers home the rhetorical
perspective on discourse: proof is what persuades. In order to keep
this perspective present, it seems prudent to generically refer to logos,
ethos, and pathos as pisteis.
The problem with Greene's "modalities of argument" label is
more serious. Elsewhere in his article, Greene variously refers to the
legitimate "subjects" of constitutional argument as "types," "arche-
53 See id. at 1443 tbl.1.
54 See, e.g., Greene, supra note 2, at 1394 (labelling a pathetic appeal as "a mode of persua-
sion" and then distinguishing subjects of argument from "forms of rhetoric").
55 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 27, at 31 n.11.
56 Greene does refer to pisteis once in his article. See Greene, supra note 2, at 1398. My
modest suggestion is to use the term generically.
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types," and "modalities." While Greene's type/archetype nomencla-
ture makes sense, his use of "modality" elides the very distinction he
seeks to establish. This is because "modality" is Bobbitt's term of art,
and Greene's basic claim is that Bobbitt's framework improperly fails
to distinguish between rhetorical mode and constitutional subject.
Given this, it seems unwise to utilize Bobbitt's loaded term of art at
all. 8
Sticking to Aristotle's rhetorical nomenclature avoids such confu-
sion. The appropriate rhetorical term for the axis referring to the
subjects of constitutional argument is topos (plural: topoi). Topos
means "place," and topoi are often referred to as "rhetorical topics."59
For Aristotle, topoi were the metaphorical places in a discourse where
speakers could look to find stock themes to build their arguments.
Aristotle distinguished between "common topics" and "special
topics."" Common topics referred to lines of argument potentially
relevant across all discourses." This included arguments about "the
57 As a synonym for "category," "type" carries no distracting substantive or analytical conno-
tations. "Archetype" is a similarly generic term for a quintessential category.
58 To make matters worse, Greene at one point suggests that Bobbitt's understanding of
modality actually better aligns with the modes of persuasion defined by logos, ethos, and
pathos. Greene, supra note 2, at 1445 n.312. This would suggest that the labels on
Greene's grid should be reversed. Greene's equivocation between "modality" as "subject"
versus "mode of persuasion" results in sentences like this: "Each [case] fits into a more
conventional modality-just not necessarily the logical mode of that modality." Id. at
1445. Referring to the the modes of a modality is as imprecise as referring to the parts of
a partition.
59 ARISTOTLE, supra note 27, at 44. See also KATIE ROSE GUEST PRYAL, A SHORT GUIDE TO
WRITING ABOUT LAw 34 (2011). Rhetoricians sometimes refer to topoi by their Latin
name-loci (singular: locus). See, e.g., PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 41, at
83-99 (analyzing various loci in argument). Of course, Topics is also the name of Aristo-
tle's treatise on dialectical reasoning. Id. at 5, 83. As Perelman has persuasively demon-
strated, Aristotle's separate treatment of "dialectic" in Topics and "rhetoric" in On Rhelonc
rests on an analytically unnecessary distinction between arguments before individuals and
crowds. PERELMAN, supra note 29, at 4-5. Modern rhetoric is rightly concerned with dis-
course addressed to any sort of audience and therefore subsumes the formerly separate
category of dialectical reasoning contained in Aristotle's Topics. Id. at 5.
60 SeeARISTOTLE, supra note 27, at 44. As Kennedy points out, ancient rhetorical handbooks
also provided literal places to find topoi. Id. See also PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, su-
pra note 41, at 83 ("As used by classical writers, loci [topoi] are headings under which ar-
guments can be classified. They are associated with a concern to help a speaker's in-
ventive efforts and involve the grouping of relevant material, so that it can easily be found
again when required. Loti have accordingly been defined as storehouses for argu-
ments.").
61 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 27, at 45 n.68. See also PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TTECA, supra
note 41, at 83.
62 See PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, supra note 41, at 83 (defining "common places" as
arguments that "can be used indiscriminately for any science and [that] do not depend
on any").
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possible and impossible," "past and future fact" and "degree of mag-
nitude or importance," as well as arguments from grammatical form,
analogy, definition, division, induction, purpose, consequence, and
so on.63 Special topics, on the other hand, were discourse-specific.
For example, special topics in politics considered subjects like financ-
es, war and peace, national defense, imports and exports, and the
framing of laws.64 Aristotle also analyzed special topics in judicial
rhetoric, systematically considering subjects relevant to debates over
"justice and injustice" and "wrongdoers and those wronged."5
Returning to Bobbitt and Greene, it seems proper to describe as
special constitutional law topoi those argument categories described
by text, history, structure, doctrine, and consequences." These topoi
point to the subjects for argument accepted as legitimate in constitu-
tional controversies. If an advocate or judge wishes to make an ar-
gument for or against the constitutionality of a contested law, for ex-
ample, she will consider lines of analysis elaborating upon topoi of
text, doctrine, or so on. At the same time, she will not waste time in-
venting arguments wholly disconnected from these legitimate topics.6 7
Constitutional law topoi neither state transcendent truths about the
Constitution, nor indicate answers to disputed questions. Rather,
they provide subject-matter tools to aid invention.
The two-dimensional approach thus disaggregates Bobbitt's
framework along the axes of content and form. While topoi inspire
the content of argument, pisteis provide rhetorical form. This dis-
aggregation actually helps clarify the meaning of Bobbitt's trouble-
some notion of "modality."
63 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 27, at 157-61, 172-84. As a relentless classifier, Aristotle natu-
rally used different words to describe different kinds of common topics. However, it
seems best not to dive too deeply into Greek soup for the purposes of this constitutional
law and rhetoric project.
64 Id. at 53.
65 See id. at 92-100.
66 For now, I leave off Bobbitt's category of ethical argument. Part IV infra will reintroduce
this category and argue for the necessity of its inclusion in the list of legitimate constitu-
tional op oi.
67 Though he does not use the term, Bobbitt vividly describes the futility of advancing ar-
guments not drawn from accepted topoi. See BOBrrr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note
1, at 6 ("One does not see counsel argue, nor ajudge purport o base his decision, on ar-
guments of kinship . . . . Nor does one hear overt religious arguments or appeals to let
the matter be decided by chance or reading entrails.").
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As noted above, Bobbitt defined constitutional modalities as "the
ways in which legal propositions are characterized as true from a con-
stitutional point of view."" Ways of characterizing constitutional
truth necessarily involve both content and form. Modality is thus best
understood as describing the discursive intersection of topoi and
pisteis-the union of content and form in actual constitutional argu-
ment. This modified understanding of modality can be visualized us-
ing a new grid.
Mxleds oflkf(1istels)
Doctrine
SConsequences
Vakle
Figure 2: Constitutional Modalities: Union ofPisteis and Topoi
Careful readers will note that the figure above changes more than
just the labels on Greene's table. The list of topoi contains one subject
of constitutional dispute that Greene does not recognize-value ar-
gument. This Article maintains that Greene's failure to include value
argument as a legitimate topos is a critical error and the one that most
threatens the vitality of the constitutional law and rhetoric project.
The next Part defends that charge.
68 See id. at 12. As argued supra in Part III, I find Bobbitt's insistence that modality is propo-
sitional to be incomplete given thejudgment imperative.
Text
History
Structure
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IV. VALUE ARGUMENT IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
After transforming Bobbitt's one-dimensional list of argument
modalities into a two-dimensional grid, Greene proposes another ma-
jor structural change to Bobbitt's typology. Specifically, Greene ad-
vocates removing Bobbitt's category of "ethical argument" from the
list of legitimate constitutional subjects of argument (which we now
call topoi)." Greene's move has obvious roots in Bobbitt's peculiar
nomenclature: Bobbitt defines "ethical" arguments as "deriving rules
from those moral commitments of the American ethos that are reflect-
ed in the Constitution.,,7 0 Greene interprets this reference to ethos as
invoking a concept "parallel to rather than modified by logos and pa-
thos."7 ' He therefore concludes that "ethical argument" is better un-
derstood as invoking a mode of persuasion (which we now call pis-
tis) .2
The problem with Greene's analysis is that it conflates different
meanings of ethos. Bobbitt never used ethos in the rhetorical or argu-
mentative sense. Rather, Bobbitt's category of ethical argument es-
sentially mirrors what Richard Fallon later called "value arguments."
Greene's reclassification of Bobbitt's ethical category thus infelici-
tously removes value arguments from the list of legitimate constitu-
tional law topoi. This is a mistake because value arguments play a vital
role in constitutional adjudication. The obvious solution is to rein-
state value arguments as a legitimate constitutional topos and to
acknowledge the logos-, ethos-, and pathos-based imensions of this sub-
ject.
A. Ethical Argument v. Proof by Ethos
Since Bobbitt's ethical modality has attracted criticism, Greene's
purging of the category from his argument typology is understanda-
ble. Indeed, some have denounced the ethical modality as "mislead-
ing" and "seriously flawed."7 4  These critics have a point; Bobbitt's
69 Green, supra note 2, at 1443-44.
70 BoBBirr, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 13 (emphasis added).
71 Greene, supra note 2, at 1443.
72 Id. at 1444.
73 See Fallon, supra note 19, at 1204-05 ("Although various other definitions would be possi-
ble, I shall use the term 'value argument' to refer only to claims about the moral or polit-
ical significance of facts or about the normative desirability of outcomes.").
74 See Greene, supra note 2, at 1444 ("It is for like reasons that Bobbit's treatment of this
category has been called idiosyncratic,' 'misleading,' and 'seriously flawed.'") (citing
Daniel A. Farber, Book Review, 67 MINN. L. REv. 1328, 1332 (1982); Martin H. Redish,Judi-
cial Review and Constituiionai Ethics, 82 MICH. L. REv. 665, 671 (1984)).
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analysis of ethical argument can be obscure. Despite this academic
bathwater, there is a baby worth saving. For Bobbitt is surely correct
that the moral commitments of our constitutional system remain a
legitimate subject for constitutional argument.
Greene's apparent rejection of this sensible position may be root-
ed in terminological confusion. The culprit word is "ethical."
Greene argues that "remaining faithful to the Aristotelian conception
of ethos" requires him to interpret Bobbitt's ethical category of argu-
ment as "parallel to rather than modified by logos and pathos."" In
other words, ethos belongs in the same category as logos and pathos.
Though this sounds reasonable enough, the reality is that Bobbitt
never used ethos in its rhetorical sense.
The word ethos actually has multiple meanings. In Constitutional
Fate, Bobbitt explains the meaning he intended:
In the end I decided on the term "ethical" largely because of its etymo-
logical basis. Our word "ethical" comes from the Greek jIK6q (ethikos),
which meant "expressive of character" when used by the tragedians. It
derives from the 'Oog (ethos) which once meant the habits and character
of the individual, and is suggestive of the constitutional derivation of eth-
76
ical arguments.
This passage makes crystal clear that Bobbitt uses ethos/"ethical" in
the manner of the Greek tragedians-not Greek rhetoricians." Trage-
dians embraced "character" as a poetic-moral concept. Consistent
with this, Bobbitt invokes ethos only in its derived, ordinary-English
sense: "the distinguishing character, sentiment, moral nature, or
guiding beliefs of a person, group, or institution"" (since he uses it in
its ordinary-English sense, Bobbitt does not subsequently italicize
"ethos"). Bobbitt's ethical modality thus concerns moral beliefs in-
herent in the American constitutional ethos.
Contrast this with the technical meaning of ethos in rhetoric. In
argument theory, ethos refers to form of proof, a mode of persuasion.
Rather than proof by reason (logos) or emotion (pathos), ethos con-
cerns proof by authority. Aristotle rooted his concept of ethos in the
75 Greene, supra note 2, at 1443 (emphasis added).
76 Bobbitt, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 1, at 95.
77 Despite some overlap, the tragedians and rhetoricians were by and large separate. Aristo-
tle did write about theory of tragedy in Poetics, of course, and therein analyzed ethos as a
tragic concept. However, he did not employ the word in the same way in his analysis of
argument. CompareJames Hutton, Introduction to ARISTOTLE's POETICS 7 (James Hutton
trans. 1982) (noting the different senses of "ethos" in POETICS) with ARISTOTLE, supra note
27, at 38 (identifying ethos as rhetorical pisteis).
78 Ethos Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ethos
(last visited Mar. 21, 2016).
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authority of an argument's advocate-the speaker." Though Aristo-
tle undeniably linked proof by ethos to the "character" of the speaker,
his underlying focus was on the authority of the speaker's argument.80
For Aristotle then, proof by ethos did not proceed "from a previous
opinion that the speaker is a certain kind of person.""' Instead, per-
suasion by ethos "should result from the speech."82
It is no accident that Aristotle called ethos "the most authoritative
form of persuasion." Ethos, properly understood in rhetoric, is au-
thority. 4  Certainly, it makes sense to conceive of authority as a dis-
tinct mode of proof in law. Sometimes a judge will determine that
the law means X based on a reasoned interpretation of sources A, B,
and C. This is proof by logos. Occasionally, as Greene points out, the
law will mean X because the judge feels X is true "deep down in [her]
heart." This is persuasion through pathos. And very often, a judge
will find the law means X simply because authority says the law means
X. This is proof by ethos.
Proof by authority is entirely different than proof by reason or
through emotion. Greene practically acknowledges as much, noting
at one point that "the ipse dixit character of . .. argumentation sug-
gests an ethical cast."8" Ipse dixit ("he, himself said it") is the paragon
of argument based on naked authority rather than reason. Of
course, every ethos-based argument need not make such a raw appeal
to power. The point is just that ethos persuades through the authority
of "character," not through character itself. Equally important, ethos
need not derive from moral authority to persuade. Depending on the
discourse, successful authority can also be legal, religious, parental,
academic and so on.
79 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 27, at 38, n.40 ("Here ... the role of character in speech is re-
garded as making the speaker seem trustworthy.").
80 Id. at 38-39 & n.41 ("Unlike Isocrates[,] ... Aristotle does not include in rhetorical ethos
the authority that the speaker may possess due to position in government or society, pre-
vious actions, reputation, or anything except what is actually said in speech.").
81 Id. at 39.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Though I see this as entirely consistent with Aristotle, I concede that he did not directly
advocate this position. However, building upon Aristotle's insights is standard practice in
Neo-Aristotelian argument theory. Thus, Stephen Toulmin proposed his canonical ar-
gument schema to correct the ambiguities in Aristotle's syllogism between major premise
and backing for major premise. TOULMIN, supra note 28, at 100-05. For his part, Chaim
Perelman rejected Aristotle's distinction between rhetoric and dialectic to advance his
unified theory of argument. See Perelman, PERELMAN & OLBRECHTS-TVTECA, suffra note
41, at 5. Though Aristotle provides the starting point for any analysis of ethos, we need
not give him the Last Word.
85 Greene, supra note 2, at 1445.
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B. Morals and Values
Although Bobbitt's category of ethical argument shares its ety-
mology with rhetorical ethos, the underlying concept is very different.
Bobbitt uses the category to elucidate a particular kind of moral dis-
course in constitutional debate. By removing Bobbitt's ethical argu-
ment from his list of legitimate topoi, Greene effectively argues that
reasoned (logical) discussion of values has no legitimate place in con-
stitutional law. To demonstrate this, Figure 3 below lists side-by-side
the legitimate argument topoi recognized by Bobbitt," Fallon," and
Greene."
Bobbitt Fallon Greene
Historical Framers Intent History
Textual Text Text
Structural Constitutional Theory Structure
Doctrinal Precedent Precedent
Prudential [Policy] Consequences
Ethical Value
Figure 3: Topoi Recognized by Bobbitt, Fallon, and Greene
The most striking feature of Figure 3 is the level of agreement be-
tween these three prominent constitutional law theorists. The con-
sensus is ironclad on four topoi: history (relying on the intentions of
framers and ratifiers of the Constitution);" text (looking to the se-
mantic meaning of the words and phrases in the Constitution);
structure (inferring rules from the relationships that the Constitution
mandates among the structures it sets up);9' and precedent (applying
86 See BOBBITT, CONsTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 12-13.
87 See Fallon, supra note 19, at 1195-1209.
88 See Greene, supra note 2, at 1443.
89 See BOBBrr, CONSITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 12. Greene adopts Bob-
bitt's term here. Greene, supra note 2, at 1443. Although Fallon calls this topos "Framer's
Intent," its synonymy with Bobbitt's and Greene's category is self-evident. See Fallon, su-
pra note 19 at 1198-99.
90 See, e.g., BoBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 12. The consensus
is so complete on this topos that all three use the same word in the same way.
91 See, e.g., BoBalTT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 12-13. Once again,
Greene adopts Bobbitt's term. Greene, supra note 2, at 1443. As Greene notes, Fallon's
category of "constitutional theory" captures precisely the same subject of argument. Id. at
1424 n.180.
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rules generated by doctrine) . The fifth topos-consequences (seek-
ing to balance the costs and benefits of a particular rule)-also
counts as an essentially agreed-upon category, even though the three
theorists adopt different terms."
This leaves one final topos. Bobbitt calls it ethical argument, while
Fallon calls it value argument. Greene offers no comparable legiti-
mate subject of argument. This is unfortunate. Indeed, this omission
actually undermines Greene's own admirable commitment to pro-
moting democratic deliberation in constitutional law in light of our
polity's core values. The fatal flaw in Greene's approach is that it
relegates all value debate to pathos through emotional appeals to his-
tory, text, structure, precedent and consequences. Yet rational logos-
based debate over values is both a regular feature of constitutional
discourse and normatively desirable. Our constitutional argument
typology should reflect this by including value as a legitimate subject.
To justify this conclusion, let us first revisit Bobbitt's ethical mo-
dality. As noted above, critics have previously attacked this category
of Bobbitt's schema." However, this criticism largely strikes at Bob-
bitt's particular implementation of the category; it does not question
the abstract idea of a constitutional topos rooted in morality. Thus,
Bobbitt's abstract assertion that ethical argument concerns moral
commitments in the Constitution is not the same as his specific asser-
tion that the "only American ethos reflected in the Constitution is the
ethos of limited government."7 Rebuke of the latter proposition
92 See Greene, supra note 2, at 1424. Though Bobbitt calls his category "Doctrinal," the rela-
tionship to precedent is again self-evident.
93 Greene explicitly aligns his notion of argument from "consequences" with Bobbitt's
"prudential" category. See Greene, supra note 2, at 1441 ("Prudential or consequentialist
argument . .. speaks to a certain judicial pragmatism that recognizes that securing the
rule of law over time requires the exercise of practical wisdom. Judges must attend to the
political and economic circumstances surrounding a decision.") (internal quotation
marks omitted). Although Fallon does not assign such policy arguments a separate head-
ing (thus the square brackets and italics in Figure 1), he includes arguments about politi-
cal and economic consequences under the general header of "value arguments." See Fal-
lon, supra note 19, at 1205 n.71, 1207 (acknowledging that his category of value
arguments "sweeps in [policy] arguments").
94 See Greene, supra note 2, at 1452-56 (justifying pathetic argument as promoting demo-
cratic deliberation in light of values).
95 See infra Part V.C. (giving three examples of logos-based value argument from Fourth and
First Amendment cases).
96 See supra note 74 and accompanying text
97 Greene, supra note 2, at 1443 (citing BOBBiTr, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra
note 1, at 21; BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 1, at 144-46).
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does not call into doubt the former. A similar analysis diminishes the
force of other common critiques of Bobbitt and ethical argument."
Yet we need not rely upon Bobbitt to see the sense of a separate
value-based topos. Richard Fallon provides a more coherent and less
controversial path to the same conclusion. Value argument plays a
prominent role in Fallon's well-regarded constitutional argument ty-
pology." According to Fallon, "value arguments assert claims about
what is good or bad, desirable or undesirable, as measured against
some standard that is independent of what the constitutional text re-
quires."'" He further distinguishes between two kinds of cases in
which value arguments have a conventionally accepted role: (1) cases
involving "constitutional language whose meaning has a normative or
evaluative component;"'o' and (2) cases "where arguments within
other categories [of topoi] are indeterminate or closely balanced" and
values appeals are made to break the deadlock.'02
Fallon's examples from his first category suffice to make the case
for value argument as a legitimate topos. He notes that constitutional
phrases like "due process," "equal protection," "unreasonable search and
seizure," or "cruel and unusual punishment" require value judgment.
The text itself provides no guide to determining the proper criteria
for implementing these "essentially contest[ed]" values and con-
cepts.10 4  An explicitly normative constitutional jurisprudence has
consequently evolved in these areas that requires debate over "evolv-
ing standards of decency in a maturing society,"'0 5 "reasonable expec-
tations of privacy"106 and so on. or
98 Consider, for example, Professor Farber's cutting critique of Bobbitt's notion that fair-
ness to Indians reflects the American ethos. See Farber, supra note 74, at 1332. The un-
deniable reality of systematic mistreatment of Native Americans under U.S. law does ne-
gate the idea that moral commitments of the nation are a legitimate subject for
constitutional discourse.
99 See Fallon, supra note 19, at 1204 ("Sometimes openly, sometimes guardedly, judges and
lawyers make arguments that appeal directly to moral, political, or social values or poli-
cies. . . . Value arguments . . . enjoy almost total predominance, in much of the most re-
spected modern constitutional scholarship.").
100 Id. at 1205.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 1207.
103 Id. at 1205 (collecting cases in these fields) (emphasis added).
104 Id.
105 Fallon, supra note 19, at 1206, n.78 (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986));
see aLso, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012) (invoking "evolving standards
of decency" in striking down mandatory life without parole for juveniles); Brown v. Plata,
131 S. Ct. 1910, 1925, n.3 (2011) (considering "evolving standards of decency" in finding
California prison overcrowding contravenes Eighth Amendment).
106 Fallon, supra note 19, at 1206 n.79 (citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-28
(1984)). See also, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 958 (2012) (Alito, J., concur-
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Fallon's second category of value argument is even more instruc-
tive. This category relates directly to Fallon's analysis of the problem
of commensurability in constitutional law.'os When modalities of con-
stitutional argument conflict and point in different directions-for
example, imagine that textual analysis points to one outcome while
historical analysis suggests the opposite-no meta-discursive mecha-
nism exists to decide the conflict." Constitutional argument types
are thus incommensurable. This phenomenon resembles paradigm
conflicts in science.' Fallon suggests that value arguments play a
special role in these situations."' When coherent arguments can be
marshaled on either side of a constitutional question, values often do
and legitimately should come into play.
This does not mean that all value arguments count as legitimate.
Fallon argues that the certain "repositor[ies] of values" can be ac-
cepted as legitimate sources for value arguments (e.g., traditional
morality, consensus values, natural law, economic efficiency) while
other sources are rightly rejected (e.g., ajudge's purely personal mo-
rality or religion or policy preferences)." Importantly, Bobbitt and
Greene also share this concern with articulating an acceptable versus
non-acceptable role for value argument. Bobbitt's unpopular solu-
tion is to tether acceptable value argument to an "American ethos."
Greene rejects Bobbitt's solution but then does not deal at all with
Fallon's more direct approach."3
Greene's own solution is to tie all value argument to pathos. Of
course, it is correct that emotional appeal has a legitimate place in
constitutional discourse about values. It is also true that "emotion ...
ring) (arguing that long-term GPS surveillance constitutes violation of "reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy").
107 Perhaps the most explictly normative standard in constitutional jurisprudence comes
from substantive due process, which sometimes looks to the "traditions and conscience of
our people." See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 760 (2010) (quoting
Synder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)); see also id. (referring to other value-
based substantive-due-process inquiries like "immutable principles ofjustice which inhere
in the very idea of a free government") (internal quotation marks omitted).
108 Fallon, supra note 19, at 1189.
109 Id. at 1191-92.
110 Id. at 1191 (citing, inter alia, KUHN, supra note 12).
111 Fallon supra note 19, at 1207 ("Confronted with contending theoretical arguments that
are equally or nearly equally plausible, judges prefer those that accord with their views of
justice or sound policy.").
112 Id. at 1208-09.
113 Greene discusses Fallon's schema in some detail at the beginning of his article, but then
drops all reference to him as he gets into the mechanics of his new schema re-classifying
Bobbitt's category of "ethical argument" as a mode of persuasion. Greene, supra note 2,
at 1433-34.
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precedes and motivates assessments of value"1 4 and that "emotion re-
veals reasons, motivates action in service of reason, [and] enables rea-
son."115 Therefore, it would be a mistake to universally condemn or
banish pathos from arguments conducted about history, text, doc-
trine, structure or consequences. The emotional valence of argu-
ments about these topoi can usefully invoke value into deliberation.
Yet it does not follow that therefore all value arguments should be
tethered to pathos. For it is more than possible to debate values in a
strictly rational-that is to say logos-based-mode. Indeed, rational
deliberation about values is critical for deciding close cases that re-
quire a frank assessment of our collective priorities. Fallon's work
proves as much. Emotion is necessary, but it is not sufficient. Greene
appreciates deliberation about values, but his schema leaves no room
for independent logos- or ethos- based proof about the subject.
The simple solution to this shortcoming is to insert Fallon's topos
of value argument back into Greene's rhetorical schema. Figure 2 re-
produced again below visualizes the reformed schema. Note how this
new configuration still leaves room for all the kinds of pathetic ap-
peals that Greene compellingly defends. It just also opens up more
space for understanding legitimate value argument in constitutional
law. Recognizing value argument as a legitimate topos invites rhetori-
cal analysis of Perelman's vital concept of "value hierarchies.""6
Logos Ethos Pathos
Lk Structure
- Docttrie
Cou(.sequences
Value
Figure 2: Constitutional Modalities: Union ofPisteis and Topoi
114 Greene, supra note 2, at 1449.
115 Id. at 1450 (quoting Terry A. Marony, The Persistent Script of]udicialDispassion, 99 CALIF. L.
REV. 629, 642 (2011)).
116 See PERELMAN, supra note 29, at 80-83.
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Before exploring some examples of value argument in action, a
brief note about the visualization is in order. The grid's solid lines
should not be read to imply solid boundaries between different topoi
and pisteis. On the contrary, real life constitutional arguments often
defy neat categorization and any given argument may implicate more
than one constitutional subject or mix appeals to logos, ethos, and pa-
thos. Yet this fluid and multi-faceted reality does not undermine the
grid's schematic utility. The map is not the territory; it is rather a tool
to help identify and navigate the complex dynamics of persuasion in
constitutional discourse.
C. Three Examples of Value Argument
Having set out the rhetorical theory, the time has come to exam-
ine value argument in practice. We will consider three brief exam-
ples: one taken from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and two
from the First Amendment realm. Each example considers the phe-
nomenon from a different angle. Taken together, the examples illus-
trate the centrality of value argument to our deepest constitutional
conflicts.
Consider first Maryland v. King."' King was a 5-4 decision in which
the majority upheld Maryland's law authorizing the collection and
analysis of DNA taken from people arrested for, but not convicted of,
certain serious crimes."" Debate in the case formally turned on topoi
of doctrine and consequences."9 Yet the conflict also implicated val-
ues at a very deep level. In his dissent's conclusion, Justice Antonin
Scalia wrote:
Today's judgment will, to be sure, have the beneficial effect of solving
more crimes; then again, so would the taking of DNA samples from any-
one who flies on an airplane[] . .. applies for a driver's license, or at-
tends a public school. Perhaps the construction of such a genetic panop-
ticon is wise. But I doubt that the proud men who wrote the charter of
our liberties would have been so eager to open their mouths for royal in-
.120
spection.
117 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
118 Id. at 1958.
119 Doctrinal argument included whether King's case fell under prior caselaw requiring "in-
dividualized suspicion" as opposed to more general "reasonableness." Compare id. at
1969-70 (analyzing cases), with id. at 1981-82 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (offering competing
interpretation of doctrinal requirements). Arguments from consequences weighed the
government's practical interest in "identification" against arrestees' reduced interest in
privacy. Id. at 1975-78.
120 Id. at 1989 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
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This short passage is pure value argument. And it relies upon logos,
ethos, and pathos to condemn the majority's decision.
The pathos in Scalia's argument here comes in his reference to a
"genetic panopticon." He seeks to evoke a visceral reaction against
the Maryland law by equating it with Big Brother surveillance. He
does not, however, rationally justify calling an arrestee-only law a
"panopticon." Scalia's reference to "the proud men who wrote our
charter of liberties" and their likely reaction to the prospect of
"open [ing] their mouth for royal inspection" sounds in both pathos
and ethos. The humor is pathos. The reference to the founding gen-
eration and the implicit plea to their authority on this question ex-
emplifies ethos.
At the same time, the whole paragraph is framed by logos. And it
is a logos rooted in value hierarchy. Scalia admits that solving crimes
using DNA testing has value. However, he posits that this crime-
solving value does not always trump Fourth Amendment liberty (he
places liberty higher in the value hierarchy). To persuade his reader
on this point, Scalia reasons that a contrary value hierarchy would jus-
tify taking the DNA of anyone who flies on an airplane, applies for a
driver's license, or attends public school. Whether readers approve
or disprove of Scalia's logic here, there is no doubt that it is a logos-
based argument about values.
Few would dispute that Scalia's analysis in King falls well within the
realm of legitimate constitutional discourse. Yet Greene's schema
does not properly capture and categorize the Justice's arguments.
Under the unmodified schema, the logic of Scalia's hierarchy proba-
bly would be equated with consequences (or perhaps history) and his
discussion of value choices would be regarded exclusively as emo-
tional appeal. This obscures the rationality inherent in Scalia's order-
ing of liberty above security. Our modified schema permits under-
standing his value appeal as rooted in logos while still recognizing that
his argument uses pathos to achieve emotional valence and ethos to
enhance argument authority.
The commonplace nature of Scalia's value appeal in King bears
emphasis."' Weighing the value of solving crime against the value of
individual liberty/privacy is a regular task of Fourth Amendment ju-
risprudence. Advocates can and should make value arguments ani-
121 I use "commonplace" deliberately here because of its rhetorical origin. The English word
is a translation of the Latin locus communis or the Greek koinos topos. See entry for "com-
monplace" in Silva Rhetorica available at http://rhetoric.byu.edu. In short, "common-
place" refers to Aristotle's idea of common topics. Cf supra text accompanying note 63;
ARISTOTLE, supra note 27, at 157-61, 172-84.
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mated by logos, ethos, and/or pathos when urging a particular Fourth
Amendment outcome. And judges can and should consider such ar-
guments. To see the situation otherwise-to view value argument as
somehow illegitimate or beyond the pale-would impoverish the dis-
course and prevent its participants from speaking frankly about the
true axis of disagreement in the conflict.2 2
The Fourth Amendment context is hardly the only one that re-
quires honest debate over competing social values. First Amendment
jurisprudence involves a similarly fundamental tension between indi-
vidual freedom and collective interest. Arguments over the proper
boundaries of speech or conscience often demand explicit value ar-
gument advanced through logos, ethos, and pathos. To illustrate, con-
sider two final examples-one historic, one contemporary.
The historic example concerns a famous pair of cases from the
World War II era. Both cases concerned whether public schools
could expel students who, for religious reasons, refused to recite the
Pledge of Allegiance. Since we have until now focused on dissenting
opinions,"' it is worth noting that the opinions analyzed here both
state the majority argument.
The Supreme Court decided the first of the two Pledge cases,
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, in 1940.124 Writing for an eight-
122 The rhetorical term of art for the axis of disagreement or point of issue in a dispute is
stasis. See Stephen E. Smith, Defendant Silence and Rhetorical Stasis, 46 CONN. L. REV.
ONLINE 19, 21 n.1 (2013) (quoting LINDA WOODSON, A HANDBOOK OF MODERN
RHETORICAL TERMS 57 (1979) ("[Stasis and status mean] [t]he proposition, or definition,
or critical issue to be considered in a piece of discourse.")). This type of argument differs
from a deliberative or epideictic argument. See Smith, supra, at 21 n.2 (quoting Antoine
Bract, The Classical Doctrine of Status and the Rhetorical Theory of Argumentation, 20 PHIL. &
RHETORIC, no. 2, 1987, at 79, 81 ("During the preparation of their speeches both parties
imagine that they are in the courtroom. . . . [T]hey anticipate their opponent's argu-
ments and decide on their reaction to them. In this way, they ultimately deduce . . . the
crucial question that the judge must answer.")).
123 The focus on dissenting opinions follows from Greene. His examples of legitimate pa-
thetic argument almost exclusively derive from dissents. Indeed, four of the five primary
examples of pathetic argument analyzed by Greene are dissents. See Greene, supra note 2,
at 1443 tbll. The fifth example is not a majority opinion either, but rather a concur-
rence. Id. Though Greene does highlight this connection between pathos and dissent, it
is important to note. One of the key rhetorical functions of dissents is to advocate for
long-term change in the law. For this ambition to work, emotional valence is critical. For
my own take on how dissents can change constitutional discourse, see Colin Starger, Exile
on Main Street: Competing Traditions and Due Process Dissent, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1293 (2012);
Colin Starger, Expanding Stare Decisis: The Role of Precedent in the Unfolding Dialectic of Brady
v. Mayland, 46 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 75 (2012); Colin Starger, The Dialectic of Stare Decisis Doc-
trine, in PRECEDENT IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (C.J. Peters ed., 2014).
124 See generally Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). In Gobitis, the school
children were Jehova's Witnesses. See id. at 592 (explaining grounds of their religious ob-
jection).
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justice majority, Justice Felix Frankfurter upheld the constitutionality
of mandatory Pledge recitals despite the obvious First Amendment
concerns. In a key passage, Frankfurter reasoned:
Even if it were assumed that freedom of speech [applies,] . . . the ques-
tion remains whether school children, like the Gobitis children, must be
excused from conduct required of all the other children in the promo-
tion of national cohesion. We are dealing with an interest inferior to none in
the hierarchy of legal values. National unity is the basis of national securi-
126
ty.
Frankfurter concluded that national unity trumped other liberties in
this instance because "the ultimate foundation of a free society is the
binding tie of a cohesive sentiment.""m Without question, Frankfur-
ter's opinion both declared law and weighed competing societal val-
ues. Yet, his advocacy proceeded primarily by appeal to logos rather
than pathos. 12
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, decided three
years later, a majority of the Court reversed Gobitis and declared
mandatory Pledge recitals unconstitutional.'"s On behalf of himself
and five others, Justice Robert H. Jackson wrote:
The case is made difficult not because the principles of its decision are
obscure but because the flag involved is our own. Nevertheless, we apply
the limitations of the Constitution with no fear that freedom .. . will dis-
integrate the social organization. To believe that patriotism will not
flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of
a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of
our institutions to free minds.13 0
In this passage, Jackson mixes pathos and logos. He acknowledges the
case's emotional stakes but appeals to freedom as a matter of both
faith and reason.m
125 Id. at 600.
126 Id. at 595 (emphasis added).
127 Id. at 596.
128 Of course, Frankfurter's opinion did not rely solely on logos. At least one famous passage
sounds in ethos, if not also in pathos. See id. ("Situations like the present are phases of the
profoundest problem confronting a democracy-the problem which Lincoln cast in
memorable dilemma: 'Must a government of necessity be too strong for the liberties of its
people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?' No mere textual reading or logical
talisman can solve the dilemma."). By and large, however, Frankfurter's opinion is relent-
lessly rational.
129 SeeW. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that requiring
students to state the Pledge of Allegiance is unconstitutional).
130 Id. at 641.
131 Id. The idea that we should have faith in freedom rather than fear freedom is an essen-
tially emotional appeal to what we know "deep down in our hearts." At the same time,
the idea that mandatory patriotism implies weak societal institutions is a logical argu-
ment.
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The challenge of isolating Jackson's rhetorical mode recurs
throughout the opinion. Consider another line, which is among the
most celebrated aphorisms in all of constitutional law:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
152nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion....
Is this an appeal based on logos, ethos, or pathos? Arguably, it is all
three. 13" Though his precise rhetorical mode is hard to pin down, 3 4
the subject of Jackson's constitutional argument concerns value
through and through.ss
Once more, few would dispute the legitimacy of such canonical
statements of constitutional principle. Yet, the fluidity of Jackson's
rhetorical mode makes clear that this legitimacy derives from the
centrality of value choices to the Pledge debate rather than from re-
course to logical, ethical, and/or pathetic appeals. In other words, it
is the practical necessity and moral imperative of appealing to emo-
tion when weighing the deep and conflicting First Amendment values
of "national unity" versus "freedom of conscience" that render Jack-
son's rhetoric legitimate.3
For our final example of value argument in action, consider the
Westboro Baptist Church military funeral case, Snyder v. Phelps.'" Af-
ter Westboro members picketed the funeral of Marine Lance Cor-
132 Id. at 642.
133 The pathos in Jackson's statement is in his clear appeal to our deepest emotional intui-
tions about "our constitutional constellation." Id. His logos is rooted in his analysis of the
implications of the opposite proposition-that officials can dictate what shall be ortho-
dox. Id. Finally, the absence of any external authority for his bold statement shows that
Jackson relies on his own ethos to advance his argument, which is certainly enhanced by
the eloquence of his writing.
134 The difficulty of isolating the precise appeal employed by Jackson thus stands as a vivid
demonstration of the multi-faceted nature of many (constitutional) arguments. Cf supra
p. 1371 (emphasizing the schematic nature of the grid).
135 In contrast to Frankfurter, Jackson places freedom of individual conscience above "pro-
motion of national cohesion" in the "hierarchy of legal values." See Minersville Sch. Dist.
v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595 (1940). Notably, the particular kind of value argument ad-
vanced byJackson here aligns perfectly with Bobbitt's idea of an appeal to the "American
ethos." Here Jackson makes an argument about the "national character" of the United
States. See supra p. 1367 (describing the practical equivalency of Bobbitt's ethical modali-
ty with value modality).
136 To use Greene's terms, the legitimacy ofJackson's opinion derives from the fact that it
addresses "constitutional subjects." See Greene, supra note 2, at 1466. According to
Greene, pathos is more legitimate when "the appeal seeks to persuade the reader of the
substance or valence of an established constitutional subject rather than seeking more di-
rectly to persuade the reader of a particular adjudicative outcome." Id. Freestanding pa-
thos arguments lack legitimacy; they need tethering to constitutional topoi to be acceptable
within the discourse.
137 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
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poral Matthew Snyder holding their typical hateful signs (e.g.,
"Thank God for Dead Soldiers," "Fags Doom Nations," "You're Going
to Hell"), Snyder's father successfully sued for Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress ("IIED") and won a multi-million dollar judg-
ment.'- In an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth
Circuit's decision to vacate the judgment on First Amendment
grounds.13 9
In a classic solo dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito harshly condemns
the majority's value priorities. The very first line of the opinion sets
the tone: "Our profound national commitment o free and open de-
bate is not a license for the vicious verbal assault hat occurred in this
case."'" From there, Alito proceeds:
Petitioner Albert Snyder is . . . simply a parent whose son, Marine
Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, was killed in Iraq. Mr. Snyder wanted
what is surely the right of any parent who experiences such an incalcula-
ble loss: to bury his son in peace. But . .. the Westboro Baptist Church []
deprived him of that elementary right. They first issued a press release
and thus turned Matthew's funeral into a tumultuous media event. They
then appeared at the church, approached as closely as they could without
trespassing, and launched a malevolent verbal attack on Matthew and his
family at a time of acute emotional vulnerability. As a result, Al-
bert Snyder suffered severe and lasting emotional injury. The Court now
holds that the First Amendment protected respondents' right to brutalize
141
Mr. Snyder. I cannot agree.
Alito's pathos is palpable here. His prose invites the reader to imagine
every parent's worst fear: losing a child, turned into an utter night-
mare haunted by malevolent fiends. He literally appeals to emotional
vulnerability and condemns the majority for interpreting the First
Amendment as condoning such brutality.
One viable interpretation of Alito's pathos is that it lends emotion-
al valence to his subsequent First Amendment analysis. On this read-
ing, we can classify his argument under the doctrine-pathos modality.
At the same time, Alito's argument sounds in value-logos. Through-
out his dissent, Alito intimates that basic decency requires the First
Amendment not protect emotional attacks at funerals. He writes:
"At funerals, the emotional well-being of bereaved relatives is particu-
larly vulnerable. . . . Allowing family members to have a few hours of
138 Id. at 1213-14.
139 Id. at 1219.
140 Id. at 1222 (Alito,J., dissenting).
141 Id.
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peace without harassment does not undermine public debate."M2
This is a perfectly rational argument about values.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts wrote the Snyder majority opinion. "
For the most part, he makes by-the-book doctrinal arguments. How-
ever, in a move likely designed to counter Alito's passion, Roberts
closes his opinion with a deliberately rational value argument:
Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of
both joy and sorrow, and-as it did here-inflict great pain. On the facts
before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a
Nation we have chosen a different course-to protect even hurtful
speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.
That choice requires that we shield Westboro from tort liability for its
144
picketing in this case.
Here, Roberts acknowledges the emotional stakes and effectively ad-
mits that the adjudicative outcome rankles. However, he urges us to
accept his conclusion based on a rational value hierarchy-chosen by
the Nation-that promotes public debate over public hurtful speech.
Taken together, a rhetorical reading of these opinions helps
demonstrate the propositional/non-propositional dynamic described
in Part III. The conflict between Alito and Roberts effectively pits a
pathos-based strategy versus an ethos- and logos-based one. Of course,
both jurists employ all three modes of persuasion in their opinions.
Yet Alito clearly leans most heavily on emotion while Roberts makes
his strongest appeals to authority and reason. Not coincidentally,
Alito's most persuasive argument concerns the injustice of the ulti-
mate outcome: it seems intuitively right that Snyder should win and
Westboro should lose. On the other hand, Roberts is more persua-
sive when defending a general proposition about constitutional
meaning: the most rational reading of First Amendment authority
seems to be that it protects even hurtful speech on public issues.
It is perhaps reassuring that logos and ethos appeared to trump pa-
thos in Snyder.'4 5 To maintain legitimacy, propositional logic should
normally prevail above outcome-driven intuition. However, Alito's
pathos nonetheless fundamentally elevated the debate. It gave pres-
ence to the deeper value conflict at issue. His pathos forced Roberts
to justify his conclusion with arguments beyond the doctrinal topos.
142 Id. at 1227-28 (Alito,J., dissenting).
143 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1213.
144 Id. at 1220.
145 Here it is worth rembering that Roberts spoke for eight members of the Court (with a
concurring opinion from Justice Stephen G. Breyer), while Alito dissented alone. Id. at
1212. This was apparently not a difficult call for the Court as a matter of reason and au-
thority.
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And when Roberts weighed in on the value topos, he articulated the
constitutional priority of protecting public debate over preventing
emotional harm. The debate transcended the usual First Amend-
ment morass of rules and tests and got to the real point of division.
Our constitutional discourse ends up the richer because of this rhe-
torical exchange.
CONCLUSION
The constitutional law and rhetoric project leverages ancient in-
sights to offer a critical perspective on the dynamics of proof in con-
stitutional discourse. Adding a rhetorical dimension to Phillip Bob-
bitt's enduring typology of constitutional argument types makes great
sense. However, a more rigorous theoretical grounding for constitu-
tional law and rhetoric required correcting certain critical flaws in
Jamal Greene's new framework.
The first correction pointed to the fundamentally adjudicatory na-
ture of constitutional discourse. Unlike in formal disciplines such as
mathematics, disputes in law cannot turn on abstract logical proposi-
tions alone. Because of the judgment imperative, non-propositional
intuitions about right and wrong sometimes win arguments. This ex-
plains the power and inevitability of pathos in constitutional argu-
ment. It is a point entirely consistent with Greene's argument, and
yet is one he failed to make.
The second correction introduced the terms topoi and pisteis to
clarify the key distinction between the subjects of constitutional ar-
gument (topoi) and the general modes of persuasion (pisteis). This
taxonomic intervention both reframes Bobbitt's concept of modality
and makes the new two-dimensional argument classification scheme
more coherent. Coherent classification of argument in turn facili-
tates understanding of constitutional debates. When Supreme Court
Justices disagree over the command of the Constitution, case-specific
details often obscure the debate. By abstracting their arguments into
a general framework, rigorous rhetorical analysis can reveal the con-
stitutional forest from the trees and identify the true axis of disa-
greement in a dispute.
As it happens, the true axis of dispute in the Court's most contro-
versial cases often concerns competing values. Therefore, this Article
advocated keeping "value" on the list of legitimate subjects of consti-
tutional argument. Not only does this bring Greene's framework into
line with those of Bobbitt and Fallon, it also comports with observed
practice as demonstrated by examples drawn from Fourth and First
Amendment jurisprudence.
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Though this Article has argued that value argument deserves a
place among the legitimate constitutional topoi, it bears emphasis that
not all value arguments boast an equal claim to legitimacy. Indeed,
constitutional actors often hotly contest the legitimacy of value argu-
ments and hurl accusations of 'judicial activism" at each other. Yet
this discursive reality is precisely what makes value argument so im-
portant to study and understand.
Argument over the legitimacy of considering particular values and
emotions in constitutional debate stands at ground zero of a larger
struggle over the role of constitutional law in our society. Will consti-
tutional law facilitate liberation and social change or will it uphold
stability and social order? Different constitutional actors have pro-
posed different answers to such questions over the course of our
checkered constitutional experience. Recognizing value argument as
a legitimate topos promotes rational, logos-based discussion of the hard
choices inherent in the Court's most vexing cases.
